The Big Stick Split in Two: Roosevelt vs. Hay on the Anglo-American Relationship by Shirey, William
Penn History Review
Volume 24
Issue 1 Spring 2017 Article 7
3-21-2018




This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol24/iss1/7
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
102     William Shirey
The Big Stick Split in Two
The Big Stick Split in Two: 
Roosevelt vs. Hay on 
the Anglo-American Relationship
William Shirey
 In 1895, the United States and Great Britain found 
themselves in a state of  crisis over a British intervention in 
Venezuela that had been sparked by a disagreement over the 
Venezuela-British Guiana border. Most American political elites 
sought to solve the issue by arbitration; many academic elites 
wished for their government to be as conciliatory as possible. 
During the crisis, a half-cowboy-half-politician named Theodore 
Roosevelt, then a candidate for the New York City mayoralty, 
wrote a letter to his alma mater’s newspaper stating his thoughts 
on the international debate in no uncertain terms: there was no 
time now, Roosevelt declared, for “stock-jobbing timidity” or “the 
Baboo kind of  statesmanship,” nor was there any time for those 
who were “still intellectually in a state of  colonial dependence 
on England.” The United States, according to Roosevelt, should 
insist upon the Monroe Doctrine in its fullest application, and, 
for good measure, “build a really first-class Navy.”1 Yet according 
to most historians, within two decades, Theodore Roosevelt 
had played a significant if  not determinative role in laying the 
foundation for the Anglo-American “special relationship” that 
carried the two nations through the world wars. 
 Frederick W. Marks III, in his 1979 book Velvet on Iron: The 
Diplomacy of  Theodore Roosevelt, posits that “[Roosevelt] liquidated 
virtually every object of  discord between the two countries and 
would probably have sought a more formal tie had he not feared 
the veto power of  German and Irish-American voters.” Marks 
argues that Roosevelt’s seemingly cool attitude toward Britain 
was concealing his true desire, Anglo-American partnership, for 
the sake of  political prudence in a largely Anglophobic country.2
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 The main scholar of  Theodore Roosevelt’s relationship 
with Great Britain, William N. Tilchin, argues that Roosevelt 
combined his own bombastic nationalism with a pro-British 
attitude, a sentiment he held because of  the cultural affinities 
between American and British societies as well as his cherished 
relationships with British statesmen such as Cecil Spring-Rice, 
the best man at his second wedding. Tilchin writes that, from 
his grand geostrategic considerations down to his handling of  
minor details, Roosevelt played a pivotal role in nurturing Anglo-
American relations.3
 Howard K. Beale, the deliverer of  a prolific set of  
lectures on Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy at Johns 
Hopkins University and the author of  perhaps the most-cited 
work on the subject, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of  America to 
World Power, argues that Roosevelt and his ardent companion 
Henry Cabot Lodge were indeed cold (if  not somewhat hostile) 
toward the British in the early 1890s, but grew friendlier as 
their careers progressed. This friendliness grew, his narrative 
goes, after the Spanish-American War, when Britain refrained 
from censuring America like the other European powers.4 After 
describing Roosevelt’s fury toward Britain’s aforementioned 
incursion upon the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela, Beale posits 
that by 1898 Roosevelt had “developed a full-blown foreign 
policy based on the belief  that the British and Americans shared 
common interests.”5 Beale propounds a view of  Roosevelt’s 
actions toward Great Britain that he dubbed “the cementing of  
an Anglo-American entente”; in other words, Roosevelt helped 
consummate an informal but mutually understood relationship 
of  diplomatic solidarity with Britain. His analysis is colored by the 
fact that Roosevelt “played England’s game” in the conferences 
and diplomatic skirmishes that led to the First World War.6
 Scarce dissent is to be found on Theodore Roosevelt’s 
general affinity for England and his playing a major role in 
the building of  the Anglo-American entente. Indeed, England 
and America began to deliberately form a friendly diplomatic 
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relationship beginning, at the latest estimate, in 1900, when Lord 
Lansdowne became the British secretary of  state for foreign 
affairs.7 Furthermore, it is plain that Roosevelt had a respect for 
the affinities between American and British culture and that he 
had dear British friends in important diplomatic roles.
 But the trend from wariness to entente in British-
American relations was more a British phenomenon than an 
American one; the respect that Roosevelt found for British 
culture was not meaningfully different from the respect that he 
found for other nations as disparate as Russia, Germany, and 
Japan. Similarly, though Roosevelt’s greatest foreign friends were 
indeed British, he surrounded himself  with an international 
coterie of  Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Japanese, and 
Russians with whom he shared an immense mutual fondness.8 
Yet one must go back to 1957 in order to find a historian who 
credits the strengthening of  the bonds between England and 
America not to Theodore Roosevelt himself, but to people like 
John Hay, Lord Pauncefote, Henry White, or the general foreign 
policy establishments of  England and America, or even to the 
mutual enmity toward Germany from both countries.9
 The historical facts, upon closer examination, cast the 
general conclusion of  historians like Marks, Tilchin, Beale, and 
others in a suspicious light. Historical episodes involving both 
the United States and Britain reveal that Roosevelt was, even after 
1898, often blatantly anti-British, while in fact other Republican 
actors worked to pacify Washington’s dealings with London. 
The general historical consensus thus fails to recognize that a 
diplomatic and political corps whose ideologies and affinities 
differed from Roosevelt’s levied a crucial influence on the actual 
comportment of  his administration. In addition to obscuring 
the importance of  other Republican policymakers, the historical 
consensus regarding Roosevelt’s foreign policy interprets his 
actions anachronistically through the screen of  the world wars, 
attempting either to ascribe to him a foresight that he did 
not possess, or to fit him into a facile teleology of  America’s 
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seemingly inexorable entente with Britain while ignoring the 
contingencies of  that relationship. No history has adequately 
explained Roosevelt’s role in Anglo-American relations without 
falling into these traps of  faulty historical reasoning.10
hIstorIcAl BAckground: 
BrItAIn, europe, And the unIted stAtes
 Britain, from at least the termination of  her disastrous 
effort in the Second Boer War, had been in need of  a new 
geopolitical approach. Before the imperial boom of  the 1870s 
and 1880s, only Britain had anything more than a toehold in the 
wider world. Once the other European powers—save Austria-
Hungary—crashed into Africa and Asia, Britain’s comparative 
naval and financial advantage began to wither. In the late 1890s, 
the British fought their disastrously long war in southern 
Africa against the Boers for three years, seriously draining their 
resources and their morale; at the same time, Britain and France 
nearly collided on their imperial frontiers. Under Kaiser Wilhelm 
II and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany began the 
construction of  a “risk fleet” to compete with the Royal Navy 
in the late 1890s, a clear threat against Britain’s traditional 
dominance on the sea.
 The British realized that the “splendid isolation”—in 
actuality, unilateralism—that they had practiced for decades was 
no longer viable in an increasingly multipolar world order. Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury, the last great lion of  British conservative 
statecraft and a staunch supporter of  unilateralism, left office in 
1902. Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne 
had been working since 1900 on broadening Britain’s friendships 
and minimizing the number of  her enemies, a task that became 
easier when Salisbury could impede him no longer. Although 
Lansdowne’s attempted overtures to Berlin were fruitless, the 
British successfully formed a naval compact with Japan in 1902, 
an “entente cordiale” with France in 1904, and a triple entente 
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with France and Russia in 1907. 
 Before all of  this, however, Britain had made diplomatic 
overtures to the United States, even though many northern 
American statesmen—Senator Lodge foremost among them—
publicly conveyed their detestation of  both Britain’s antagonism 
toward American control of  Hawaii and her stringent upholding 
of  Canadian fishing rights. Nevertheless, the path to an unofficial 
Anglo-American entente was paved by Britain’s hostility 
toward Spain in 1898; the relationship was slowly brought 
to its consummation as Britain brought garrisons back from 
Canada. The British at this time were also beginning to negotiate 
over recognizing at least partial American rights to the future 
Isthmian canal—and was, therefore, tacitly toying with allowing 
full American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
 The diplomatic behavior of  the United States was going 
through a set of  changes at the turn of  the century as well, perhaps 
even more profound changes than Lansdowne was to make in 
Britain. In 1898, the United States crashed onto the world scene 
in the Spanish-American War, taking the Philippines and other 
colonies. Roosevelt and his fellow “imperialist” Republicans 
such as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and—though he only 
influenced policy indirectly—the historian Alfred Thayer Mahan 
had been working their way up the ranks of  the Washington elite 
during the preceding decade, and by the late 1890s they were 
influencing naval affairs, the State Department, and the Senate. 
These men developed what Henry Cabot Lodge called the “Large 
Policy,” meaning worldwide American assertion. The Large 
Policy finally found its way into the Oval Office when Theodore 
Roosevelt assumed the presidency after the assassination of  
William McKinley in 1901.
 The expansions, different as they were, of  both Britain 
and the United States throughout the globe were in part 
subtended by cultural assumptions of  civilizational superiority. 
These assumptions were the product of  both Enlightenment 
thought and retroactive justifications of  colonial control and 
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displacement.11 In the U.S., the Republican Party and progressive 
elites peddled imperial expansion in the lead-up to the Spanish-
American War as synonymous with national honor; dominance 
in the Western Hemisphere became, therefore, an imperative for 
the sake of  civilization and Christendom.12 Furthermore, not 
only did the British end up ceding hemispheric dominance to the 
United States for pragmatic reasons during this period, but they 
also held the selfsame cultural assumptions that made it appear 
valid. That published works of  fiction, philosophy, and social 
and political thought began to flow in sharply increased volume 
between the U.S. and her motherland during the dawning hours 
of  joint Anglophone global dominance was no coincidence.13
 England was reaching out for friends and allies at the 
same time that the United States began to seriously exert its 
power throughout the world; the friendship was, in a sense, 
natural. (German Weltpolitik had seemed always to stand athwart 
America’s aims at expansion; by virtue of  the Anglo-German naval 
race and general rivalry, then, British and American diplomatic 
goals of  the late nineteenth century found a somewhat organic 
alignment.) The historiographical consensus is that Roosevelt 
played a positive role in bringing about this alignment, which 
facilitated Anglo-American cooperation during both world 
wars. Among major historians on the subject, Howard Beale has 
the most generous view on when Roosevelt began to seriously 
cooperate with the British. By 1898, Beale argues, Roosevelt was 
basing his foreign policy on the palpable necessity of  the Anglo-
American understanding.14
 Yet Roosevelt, rather than favoring Britain categorically 
over Germany or other European powers, was far more erratic 
than historians have acknowledged. He was friendly toward the 
diplomats of  Downing Street when Britain stood to advance 
American interests, but he could be shockingly pugnacious 
whenever Britain posed even a minimal threat to America’s 
geopolitical goals. Besides the latent trend that made an Anglo-
American understanding propitious at the turn of  the century, 
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it was Roosevelt’s diplomatic corps, including his Anglophilic 
Secretary of  State John Hay, that truly made an effort to build 
the Anglo-American relationship that came to define later 
decades. The clearest case of  the tension between the rabid 
“pro-American” style of  Roosevelt and the Anglophilia of  
Hay and the State Department—and the importance of  the 
structural trend of  Anglo-American friendship—can be seen in 
the Alaskan boundary dispute of  the early 1900s.
hAy And choAte In cAnAdA
 By the end of  the nineteenth century, the spheres of  
both British Canada and the United States were growing; by the 
1890s, they were bumping into each other. Roosevelt’s “pro-
Americanism” reached a fever pitch in the face of  this ever-so-
mild and indirect abrasion between America and the Imperial 
Parliament at Westminster, which controlled Canadian foreign 
affairs at the time. In 1895, two years after a dispute between 
the British and the Americans over fisheries in the Bering Sea 
had been resolved by arbitration, then-New York City Police 
Commissioner Roosevelt wrote to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge 
to say that “Great Britain’s conduct about the seals is infamous… 
[we should] seize all Canadian sailors as pirates.”15 Roosevelt also 
expressed his wish to invade Canada as punishment for Britain’s 
half-violation of  the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. In late 1895, 
he wrote: “Let the fight come if  it must; I don’t care whether our 
sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”16 
(The Americans would most emphatically not have taken Canada; 
at the time of  Roosevelt’s letter, Great Britain had fifty available 
battleships in the northern Pacific to America’s three).17
 Canadian-American—and, by extension, British-
American—friction ebbed after 1895. The British Admiralty 
continued to worry about both American and German naval 
ambitions in the North Pacific, but the Anglo-Japanese 
agreement of  1902 eventually diminished the fears.18 Downing 
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Street recognized that, in the event of  a war with the United 
States in the coming decades, British ships would ineluctably be 
batted away from Canada’s Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence 
by the up-and-coming United States, which had established 
its Naval War College in 1884 and come under the leadership 
of  a fire-breathing naval advocate in Roosevelt. Aside from a 
small fleet of  submarines, the British abandoned their military 
presence in the Western Hemisphere, preferring to count on 
diplomatic courtship of  the Americans and the loyalty of  the 
Canadians.19 Still, the tension between America’s increasingly 
positive relations with Britain and America’s increasingly strained 
relationship with British Canada was the dialectic that defined 
the Anglo-American understanding in its infant stages.
 The year 1900 saw the beginning of  the Alaskan 
boundary question. According to the 1825 treaty that demarcated 
the boundary between Alaska and Canada, the line of  separation 
was to “follow the summit of  the mountains parallel to the 
coast” north of  the Portland Channel. Yet the language was far 
too vague to draw an actual line, and an exact boundary had not 
been established.20 It is in fact unclear whether or not a mountain 
summit line parallel to the coast even exists. The treaty also 
included the phrase “winding of  the coast” and referred to the 
“Portland channel” at points crucial for its own interpretation, 
neither of  which is an obvious feature based on geography alone, 
and neither of  which had been previously defined. The British/
Canadians and the Americans each claimed two different lines 
that ran approximately northwest-southeast along the coast. 
Crucially, each side claimed control of  a pass over the Lynn 
Canal, the key spot which controlled the headwaters and allowed 
for all riverboat transport in the area.21
 When gold was discovered in the Yukon in the 1890s, 
the Canadians pressed their claim for territories that were 
left ambiguous by the treaty. In January 1900, the American 
ambassador to London, Joseph Choate, made it clear that the 
United States would agree to an arbitrative tribunal on the matter. 
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Lansdowne, wishing to be as conciliatory as possible toward 
the Americans while still keeping the Canadians happy, saw 
the question as an unnecessary roadblock to an entente.22 With 
discussions between London and Washington about the nature 
of  the future Isthmian canal becoming more serious by the 
week, the Alaskan boundary dispute became a major bargaining 
chip for both sides. As it was the most emotionally charged issue 
dividing the British and the Americans and was tightly linked 
to the future of  transportation, trade, and naval power in the 
Western Hemisphere, the topic of  Alaska’s boundary was the sine 
qua non of  Anglo-American rapprochement.23
 Secretary of  State John Hay sent a drafted proposal 
for the tribunal to Julian Pauncefote, envoy extraordinary and 
The Lynn Canal and the Skagway River. 
A gold discovery in the area would bring the United States and the British 
Empire into a pivotal near-confrontation.
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minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The British were 
initially surprised and satisfied, but Pauncefote reported that the 
judges would have very little interpretive power outside of  the 
1825 treaty, which was firmly in the United States’ favor. Canada 
and Governor-General Minto were at first “delighted,” but on 
further consideration of  the precise terms, they considered the 
United States’ proposal “most insidious.”24
 Secretary Hay, as historians have noted and as was clear 
to his contemporaries, was willing and eager to bend U.S. policy 
in England’s direction. “In sum,” comments one Hay biographer, 
“under Hay’s direction, American neutrality was distinctly 
benevolent to England.”25 In the Alaskan situation, however, an 
American interest was directly involved. Once Roosevelt was in 
office, Hay could not nakedly alter U.S. policy to favor England, 
even though (as will be shown) he disagreed with President 
Roosevelt’s tacit idea that American claims in Alaska were more 
important than the prospective relationship between Washington 
and London.26 His willingness to arrange an arbitration only 
served to put him on thin ice as secretary of  state. As Roosevelt 
would recall after Hay’s death, he was simply “not to be trusted 
on issues concerning England”—and, as an important corollary, 
he was “foolishly distrustful of  the Germans.”27
 Fortunately for the Americans, a canal treaty with England 
was in its final stages and Lansdowne was determined not to 
jeopardize it. Lansdowne’s secretary wrote to his counterparts in 
the British Colonial Office that Lansdowne wished
that the communications to the Dominion 
Government should not in any way imply that His 
Majesty’s Government associate the settlement 
of  the Alaskan Boundary and other primarily 
Canadian questions with that of  the Interoceanic 
Canal question, or that the negotiations for the…
Treaties are interdependent.28
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Lansdowne and Hay, therefore, were committed to an amicable 
resolution of  the issue. It was Roosevelt who stood as an inhibitor 
of  the trend toward conciliation.
hAy vs. roosevelt In cAnAdA
 Canada already stood on shaky legal ground. That her 
mother country of  England was unwilling to throw weight 
behind the Alaskan issue only worsened her hopeless situation. 
The British, as Canadian Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier knew, 
would frown upon any further obstructive tactics he used.29 
Thus Laurier, in January 1902, decided to arbitrate.30 Hay and 
those at the British Foreign Office were delighted that this 
source of  friction between Washington and London would soon 
be removed.
 But the events of  the previous September—the 
assassination of  William McKinley and the inauguration of  
Theodore Roosevelt as president of  the United States—had 
introduced a great deal of  volatility into America’s cooperation 
on the Alaskan issue. Roosevelt immediately made clear his 
opposition to any such arbitration as had been tentatively 
approved by the Canadians, the British, and Hay. In March 1902, 
a crestfallen Pauncefote told Lansdowne that “the President 
considers the claim of  the United States is so manifestly clear 
and unanswerable that he is not disposed to run the risk of  
sacrificing American territory under a compromise that is the 
almost certain result of  an arbitration.”31 Roosevelt, according to 
Henry Cabot Lodge, had posited in the presence of  two senators 
that at the first sign of  trouble in the disputed territory he would 
send United States troops to occupy it. One of  the two senators 
intimated that this would be a popular decision among both 
members of  Congress and the people.32
 Secretary of  State Hay pushed the reluctant Joseph 
Choate to enter private discussions at the British Foreign 
Office despite Roosevelt’s heated opposition toward anything 
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resembling arbitration. Choate noted that the British and 
Canadians were indeed open to significant compromise. In 
August 1902, Lansdowne had suggested to Choate that the 
United States could even determine the format and style of  an 
arbitration if  it were to take place.33 The significance of  Hay’s 
apparent dismissal of  Roosevelt’s hawkishness on this issue is 
often overlooked in the later historiography.34
 In September 1902, Lansdowne sent Sir Michael Herbert, 
a friend of  Roosevelt’s, to Washington as ambassador to the 
United States. Roosevelt gave him a warm reception but made it 
clear that he wished to move immediately ahead with the Alaskan 
issue. The president suggested, during his first interview with 
the new ambassador, that he might accept an Anglo-American 
jurist tribunal that carried no formal weight. Instead, it would 
be made up of  jurists selected by the American and British 
governments. The Canadian government gave its tentative assent 
on November 18. Said the Governor-General of  Canada, “My 
ministers would be disposed to consider it favorably, provided 
that the reference to a Tribunal should include all aspects of  
the question.” Lansdowne told Hay that the British, too, 
would agree.35 Roosevelt’s grudging acceptance of  Hay’s initial 
arbitrative idea could be put into effect because Lansdowne was 
willing to cooperate and because Hay had used his influence to 
grease the skids for peaceful diplomacy.
 The Alaskan issue was primarily seen as one between 
Britain and America, not as one between British Canada and 
America or some combination of  the three. Hay, in predictable 
if  absurd Anglophilic fashion, wished to see only one American 
on the commission of  six jurists. Herbert wished to see three 
Americans and three Britons, leaving out any Canadians.36 This 
was no small source of  friction between Canada and her imperial 
motherland. Laurier, in January 1903, once again publicly 
criticized the Americans for their position and actions regarding 
the Alaska treaty. He would have rather had the issue submitted 
to The Hague than to what he increasingly saw as a clearly biased 
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Anglo-American old boys’ club.37
 Herbert and some British diplomats began to dream 
of  some sort of  Anglo-American supreme court, while other 
elder British statesmen were more cautious of  the Americans.38 
But Herbert, Hay, and Lansdowne were the central players in 
the Alaskan boundary issue, and their wish for Anglo-American 
friendship superseded Roosevelt’s demand of  the satisfaction of  
American interests on one hand and British colonial relations 
on the other. In Canada, Minto and Laurier recognized their 
helplessness and on January 21 assented to a tribunal of  six 
impartial jurists. Two days later, King Edward VII gave his 
blessing.39
 In the U.S., representatives from the northwestern states 
put up a fight. They believed that ceding to Canada what was 
not Canada’s would endanger their own states; they asserted that 
there were no legal grounds on which the Canadians could stand 
Secretary of  State John Hay, c. 1904. 
The unsung hero of  the Anglo-American relationship, but to Roosevelt, 
“not to be trusted on issues concerning England” and 
“foolishly distrustful of  the Germans.”
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and that even deigning to arbitrate was a farce on the part of  
the United States. Those Americans who favored the arbitration 
declared that no matter what the tribunal said, no territory would 
be lost to Canada. Despite the protestations of  the Northwest 
(whose states were the most anti-Canadian of  all) and the 
constant, truculent “pro-Americanism” of  the president, the 
treaty passed the Senate on February 11 and cleared the path for 
negotiations to take place.40
 The international table was set for the pacification of  the 
Alaskan issue. Hay, Herbert, and Lansdowne had ensured Anglo-
American friendship, and the Canadians’ complaints seemed to 
have been sacrificed for the sake of  placating the Americans. 
Even so, Theodore Roosevelt and his pro-Americanism found a 
way to make trouble. On February 18, 1903, Roosevelt appointed 
three of  the most grossly biased politicians in all America as his 
“impartial” jurists: Secretary of  War (and longtime Roosevelt 
man) Elihu Root; Senator George Turner of  the anti-Canadian 
state of  Washington; and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, progenitor 
of  the “Large Policy” and Roosevelt’s most steadfast political 
partner.41 When the inevitable outrage came, the pathetic 
American excuse was that three unbiased judges could not be 
found. This, of  course, did little to quell the anger.42 Herbert 
declared himself  severely disheartened and disillusioned with the 
Americans.43
 Lansdowne was disappointed but still hoped for 
accommodation over anger. Britain had just terminated its 
involvement in the Anglo-German blockade of  Venezuela on 
February 14, and the blockade had caused Roosevelt’s animal 
Americanism to come frightfully to the fore. The president—
perhaps by coincidence, but more likely not—had ordered the 
admiral of  the navy to practice naval maneuvers on what was 
then the largest scale in American history in the same theater as 
the Anglo-German blockade.44 Now was simply not the time for 
the British to anger the rough-riding Roosevelt. Herbert, too, 
fully comprehended the strength of  American feeling about what 
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was seen as Britain’s bad faith. He sent notes on February 23 to 
Ottawa and London urging amicability and a quick conclusion.45 
The will of  the Canadians would not be allowed to obstruct the 
rapprochement of  the English and the Americans.
 The Canadians, angered at once by the Americans for 
their preposterous choice of  “impartial” jurists and by the British 
for their appeasement of  Roosevelt’s bullish Americanism, 
“felt called upon not only to express their dissatisfaction at 
the recent exchange of  ratifications at Washington before their 
official consent had been given, but practically to indicate that 
their assent had been rendered unavoidable by His Majesty’s 
Government.”46 Lansdowne, struggling between the rock of  
Anglo-American amity and its import and the hard place of  
Britain’s colonial obligations, was forced to ask the Americans 
for two delays in the tribunal to allow the Canadians to gather the 
necessary documents. Hay was also trying to reconcile his own 
intense, fundamental affinity for the British with the fact that 
he was the secretary of  state of  the United States of  America. 
Hay expressed disappointment at what he saw as stalling tactics. 
Roosevelt asserted to Hay a duty: 
If  the English decline to come to an agreement 
this fall, under any pretense, I shall feel that it 
is simply due to bad faith—that they have no 
sincere desire to settle the matter equitably. I 
think they ought to be made to understand that 
there must be no delay; that we have come to 
a definite agreement with them and that the 
agreement must be kept on their side as well as 
on ours, and that we shall expect them to live up 
to it without fail…I shall probably, if  they fail to 
come to an agreement, recite our case in the message 
to Congress and ask for an appropriation so that we may 
run the line ourselves.47
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 Yet Hay was not the only member of  the American 
foreign policy establishment to receive word from Roosevelt in 
these terms. On June 29, Roosevelt wrote Lodge to say that, if  
the British continued to make things difficult, he would “declare 
the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress, 
and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it 
should be run.”48 To Hay on July 29, he stated that “if  we can’t 
come to an agreement now nothing will be left but to act in a way 
which will necessarily wound British pride.”49 To Root on August 
20, Roosevelt expressed his hope that the “the British will see 
reason. If  they do not, it will be unpleasant for us, but it will be 
far more unpleasant for Great Britain and Canada.”50 To Hay on 
September 21, Roosevelt stated that he was wondering
if  the Jacks realize that…it will be far more 
unpleasant to them, if  they force the alternative 
upon us; if  we simply announce that the country 
is ours and will remain so, and that so far as it has 
not been reduced to possession it will be reduced 
to possession, and that no further negotiations in 
the matter will be entertained.51
 Other letters of  Roosevelt’s indicate even more explicitly 
his proclivity to use state force to resolve the issue. To Henry 
White on September 26, Roosevelt wrote that
I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours, 
as being for the most part in our possession, 
and the remainder to be reduced to possession 
as soon as in our judgment it was advisable—
and to declare furthermore that no additional 
negotiations of  any kind would be entered into.52
To Elihu Root on August 8, the president wrote how he “shall 
at once establish posts on the islands and sufficiently far up the 
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main streams to reduce at all the essential points our claim to 
actual occupancy…This will not be pleasant to do and it will be 
still less pleasant for the English.”53 To Frederick Jackson Turner 
on August 8, he stated that in case of  “captious objections on the 
part of  the English, I am going to send a brigade of  American 
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of  the disputed 
territory and hold it by all the power and force of  the United 
States.”54
 Roosevelt was playing fast and loose, and the British saw 
that he would risk severely harming the budding relationship 
between England and America for the sake of  a small strip of  
land in a barely inhabitable area bearing trace amounts of  gold. 
Fortunately for the sake of  smooth Anglo-American relations 
at this critical stage, Hay and the British statesmen kept cool 
heads and paved the way for London and Washington to get 
Theodore Roosevelt in his presidential years. 
A pugnacious pro-American: “I am going to send a brigade of  American 
regulars up to Skagway and take possession of  the disputed territory and hold 
it by all the power and force of  the United States.”
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along. Joseph Chamberlain, then British secretary of  state for 
the colonies, had been spooked enough by Roosevelt. He too 
resolved to quickly settle the Alaskan issue no matter the cost to 
Canada and the empire.55
 The negotiations began in September. According to 
Lord Alverstone, the British representative at the tribunal, the 
Americans behaved badly, but he wished to put up a fight. On 
several issues concerning the dispute he remained unwaveringly 
set against all that the United States wished to do. An abrupt 
turnaround in early October was likely the result of  pressure from 
Lansdowne (who was in turn feeling pressure from Roosevelt) 
toward conciliation on the part of  the British.56 The Americans 
came out with a total victory; Roosevelt and the three jurists 
were met with wide acclaim for what was seen as an enormous 
diplomatic win. The Canadians were fittingly resentful and knew 
that all injuries to Canada were being sustained for the sake of  
British friendship with America.57
 But it was Hay, not Roosevelt, who worked for diplomacy 
surrounding the Canada issue. It is difficult to imagine a scenario 
where Anglo-American amity would have remained on a smoothly 
upward ascent without Secretary Hay tempering the Roosevelt 
administration’s response. Roosevelt’s truculence, in actual fact, 
threatened significant setbacks to Anglo-American amity on 
multiple occasions; it brought Lansdowne and his enormously 
conciliatory attitude to his wit’s end. Hay’s Anglophilia and 
Lansdowne’s determination to end Britain’s “splendid isolation” 
were the determining factors that allowed the Anglo-American 
understanding to progress despite the Alaskan boundary conflict. 
Roosevelt was, realistically, a liability throughout the resolution 
of  this dispute.
lIMItAtIons And IMplIcAtIons
 Roosevelt and Hay’s respective roles in the Alaskan crisis 
should bring the historical consensus regarding Roosevelt’s 
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relationship with Britain under much harsher scrutiny. Yet a far 
more thorough analysis of  the diplomatic episodes throughout 
Roosevelt’s career is needed to establish precisely when Roosevelt 
became more disposed to treating the Anglo-American entente as 
a serious diplomatic goal. These analyses must rely on explorations 
of  the attitudes of  Roosevelt’s fellow American diplomats and 
policymakers, as the Alaskan boundary case shows that perhaps 
they were the authors of  the Anglo-American rapprochement that 
undeniably took place between 1895 and 1917. (Tantalizing leads 
for such an analysis exist: Roosevelt left much of  his East Asian 
diplomacy to Secretary Hay until his death in 1905, and Hay, in 
a remarkable suspension of  logic fitting only the most ferocious 
of  Anglophiles, attempted to blame the Russo-Japanese conflict 
on Germany, then clearly Britain’s nemesis. Roosevelt, on the 
other hand, at one point attempted to blame Japanese aggression 
on Britain, also a plain twist of  the reality on the ground.) In any 
case, a fuller exposition of  Roosevelt’s potentially more neutral 
attitude toward Britain—as opposed to the palpable Anglophilia 
of  other Republicans of  his time, like that of  John Hay, Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, and Henry White—must explain the fact that 
Roosevelt seemed to favor Britain in his later diplomacy.
 The Alaskan boundary dispute does not conclude 
the inquiry into Teddy Roosevelt’s views on Great Britain 
or the evolution of  those views, but it does destabilize the 
historiographical consensus that Roosevelt was, in his personal 
thought, a friend to Britain—or that he had become a friend 
to Britain by 1898. That others in the Republican Party of  
Roosevelt’s time—most importantly, Secretary of  State John 
Hay—were indeed Anglophilic has created the illusion that 
Roosevelt himself  was pro-Britain, whereas, in fact, until at least 
the early 1900s, Roosevelt was in fact something of  a practical (if  
absurdly feisty) “pro-American” situated in a largely pro-Britain 
party and administration. Secretary Hay, in the case of  the Alaskan 
boundary, was not tightly managed by Roosevelt with regard to 
diplomatic actions and, as illustrated above, would sometimes 
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go against the wishes of  his president. Despite Roosevelt later 
denying that Hay was a major player in the boundary dispute, it 
was indeed Hay who curbed Roosevelt’s dangerous influence on 
the situation, made the necessary diplomatic maneuvers, took 
advantage of  the British retreat from “splendid isolation,” and 
allowed the conflict to come to its peaceful resolution.
 The case study above has implications for the debate that 
runs through the literature on the appropriate characterization 
of  Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the grandest sense. Some 
scholars, most famously Henry Kissinger, have argued that 
Theodore Roosevelt can be most accurately be described as an 
American realpolitiker, always thinking systemically and globally 
while at the same time remaining conscious of  the balance of  
power.58 Historian Walter McDougall also projects some degree 
of  realism and balance-consciousness onto Roosevelt, although 
McDougall’s narrative is far more nuanced than Kissinger’s and is 
informed by the fact that the extant “Progressivism” at the turn 
of  the century was a fundamental aspect of  the Rooseveltian 
worldview.59 Howard Beale also portrays Roosevelt as seeing the 
world chiefly through the lens of  power.60 Others have disagreed 
sharply with the realist school of  analysis. Frank Ninkovich in 
his book American Imperialism argues that a structural, cultural, 
and intellectual moment was the plinth upon which American 
expansion in the Edwardian era stood, while William C. Widenor 
and John Milton Cooper Jr. have in tandem argued that Roosevelt 
and Lodge were in fact more idealistic than Woodrow Wilson 
and William Jennings Bryan, due to the “Large Policy” group’s 
Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian assumptions, their (arguably) 
more overt racial paternalism, and their near-worship of  the 
militaristic spirit.61
 The clearest example of  the anti-realist view of  
Roosevelt’s foreign policy is Frank Ninkovich’s article “Theodore 
Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” where Ninkovich asserts 
that Roosevelt’s diplomatic thought and behavior was driven 
primarily and fundamentally by an idealization of  “civilization” 
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informed by a “metahistorical outlook” of  a sort of  souped-
up Whig history.62 Citing Roosevelt’s praise of  imperialism, his 
efforts to form diplomatic ties with European nations, and his 
tendency to try to be on the “civilized” side of  conflicts abroad, 
Ninkovich portrays Roosevelt as a blind ideologue, one who saw 
himself  as having, above all else, a “duty upon the civilized races 
to transplant the seeds of  civilization where they had failed to 
germinate of  their own accord.”63
 Ninkovich’s article is unconvincing. A disproportionately 
large amount of  the primary source material used by Ninkovich to 
create his narrative is made up of  letters to high-ranking foreign 
officials, texts of  public speeches, or articles in widely circulated 
magazines—all discursive scenarios in which any president or 
diplomat might justify his actions in the most high-minded 
light. While Ninkovich’s argument in American Imperialism, which 
places Roosevelt’s actions in their proper intellectual and cultural 
context, is a welcome tonic to Kissinger’s retrojection of  later-
twentieth century American realism onto Roosevelt, his selective 
and tenuous material for “Civilization as Ideology” causes him 
to miss the mark. Ninkovich’s “civilizational” framework is 
excellent for Roosevelt’s approach to, for example, Latin America, 
but is unequipped to handle the looming and central diplomatic 
question of  Roosevelt’s presidency: how the United States 
should navigate the increasingly dire Anglo-German rivalry. It 
is no wonder that Ninkovich’s article only dares to approach the 
question of  Roosevelt’s ideas on U.S.-German relations after the 
point that the German war machine brutalized Belgium, five 
years after Roosevelt had left office.64
 The Alaskan boundary issue seems to show that 
Roosevelt’s self-proclaimed “pro-Americanism” manifested 
itself  as a short-term explosiveness, inimical both to calculated, 
systematic, balance-of-power realism and to high-minded 
normative ideas of  “civilization.” Roosevelt’s actions, when 
examined closely, cannot fit on any facile midpoint between the 
two. Furthermore, it seems that the steady hands in American 
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foreign policy were in Roosevelt’s administration. The emphasis 
ought to be taken away from Roosevelt the man, and a responsible 
evaluation of  U.S. diplomacy from 1901 to 1909 should not 
attribute successes blindly to the president but rather take into 
account the efforts of  Hay, White, Root, and others who worked 
to set policy and tame the wild man in the White House.
 The question of  Roosevelt’s role in the informal, loose 
drawing together of  the United States and Britain also engages a 
hotly debated topic in the theory of  international relations: the 
degree to which leadership matters in statecraft and diplomacy. 
Most in the field of  international relations implicitly or explicitly 
work with the idea that looking at structural, impersonal forces, 
along with culture, bureaucracy, and political systems, is the 
appropriate method by which to understand diplomacy and 
history. This is not an uncontested idea: Daniel Byman and 
Kenneth Pollack, for example, have asserted that even small 
idiosyncrasies of  leaders can have a profound impact on the 
course of  history—that the human element is a significant 
variable. They defend their thesis on a theoretical level, positing 
that state intentions—often tied up with specific leaders’ 
intentions—are germane to theories of  international relations; 
they ground their idea in case studies as well.65
 Within the debate of  leadership vs. structural causes in 
international relations theory, Robert Jervis engages with the 
tension between leaders and advisors. Jervis argues that political 
role can be a determinative force in the intentions of  different 
actors, though Jervis himself  is somewhat ambivalent about 
the extent to which structural forces dominate personal forces 
in statecraft.66 The president, Jervis’s argument goes, will face 
political pressures, while a secretary of  state like Hay will be freer 
of  electoral constraints. Jervis’s thesis is a powerful explanation 
of  the dynamics of  the Roosevelt administration during the 
Alaskan boundary crisis. Yet Roosevelt’s personality—along 
with the residue of  his previous tepidness regarding Britain—
most certainly was a factor in how he behaved, in addition to the 
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presidential pressure he faced. Similarly, Hay’s well-documented 
Anglophilia was a factor in his comportment along with his 
position at the State Department.
 Even if  structural factors were among the ultimate 
causes of  the Anglo-American rapprochement, to ignore the 
role of  leaders—especially particularly influential ones, like 
Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, or Lansdowne—is dangerous 
and reductive.67 Matters of  international relations and diplomatic 
history are too complex to focus only on any one element; 
biography and psychology must be explored as much as political 
systems and international structures. The historiography on 
Theodore Roosevelt’s own tastes and predilections regarding 
diplomacy has crucially ignored evidence of  his own ambivalent-
at-best attitude toward Great Britain, and Roosevelt’s very 
persona is far from unimportant in this analysis. The Anglo-
American entente steadied both nations before the coming 
collapse of  world order, and the causes of  that entente—not 
only those distal and impersonal, but also those proximate and 
personal—deserve painstaking attention.
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